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Marxism has differed from most other bodies of radical 
political thought in its conviction that its political 
radicalism is inseparably connected to a philosophical 
radicalism – a conviction that underlies the name of 
this journal. Engels, Kautsky and the orthodox Soviet 
Marxists all saw Marxism as distinguished from main-
stream (ʻbourgeoisʼ) social thought by the dialectical 
philosophy and method that it inherited from Hegel. 
Even Althusser, who rejected the Hegel in Marx most 
vehemently, saw Marxism as having its own distinc-
tive philosophy and method. The Aʻnalytical Marxistʼ 
movement that formed around academics like G.A. 
Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster in the early 1980s 
differs from previous versions of Marxism on just this 
point. As Marcus Roberts emphasizes in his survey of 
their thought, the Analytical Marxists simply gave up 
the idea that there is any fundamental philosophical 
or methodological difference between Marxism and 
mainstream social thought.
Instead, they have recast Marxism as distinctive 
only in its speciﬁc set of theses about the interactions 
between technology, property, class and state in the 
course of historical change. Its methodological prin-
ciples are now just the ones that analytical philosophers 
of social science have been developing throughout this 
century: distinguish and deﬁne the meanings of terms 
and propositions clearly; respect the rules of formal 
logic in argument; explain the workings of wholes by 
separating them into parts; break theories down into 
parts that can be stated independently of each other; 
express those theories in an unambiguous and empiri-
cally testable form; and abandon or reconstruct them if 
they do not stand up to the evidence. The term ʻana-
lytical ,ʼ with its suggestions of analytical philosophy 
and of the analysis of both social wholes and theories 
into their parts, summarizes these principles neatly. 
Beyond them, the Analytical Marxists looked to the 
concepts and explanatory methods of contemporary 
mainstream social science, and especially of neoclassi-
cal economics and its offspring, rational choice theory, 
in order to state their Marxism.
The result is a novel version of Marxism that 
adheres – at least provisionally – to the basic theses 
of Marx sʼ social theory, but also adopts a ʻbourgeoisʼ 
set of methodological prescriptions, and indeed uses 
those prescriptions to attack other versions of Marxism 
as obscurantist, metaphysical and unscientiﬁc, just as 
Cold Warriors like Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin did 
earlier in the century. It expresses itself in a language 
that has almost nothing in common with traditional 
Marxist discourse. Here, for example, is John Roemer 
(in Analytical Marxism, Cambridge, 1986) on ideology 
and class struggle:
Perhaps ideology is an institution which cuts trans-
action costs of various kinds; or perhaps ideology 
should be conceived as a set of satisﬁcing rules which 
an agent adopts to limit his own feasible set. Another 
question is to decide precisely where class struggle 
should ﬁt into the general equilibrium model: does 
it determine preferences, or endowments, or is it a 
bargaining technique in a non-competitive model?
In addition to the concepts and techniques of analyti-
cal philosophy and mainstream social science theory, 
to which they freely helped themselves, the Analytical 
Marxists could draw on several bodies of earlier Anglo-
phone Marxist work that was informed by some of their 
aims: for example, Edward Thompson and Christopher 
Hill sʼ empirically grounded historiography, and Steed-
man and Morishima sʼ mathematical, neo-Ricardian 
reconstructions of Marx sʼ economic theory. This helps 
to explain the quantity and variety of work that the 
Analytical Marxists were able to produce in the 1980s. 
In his book Roberts takes us painstakingly across the 
whole territory, summarizing the main works and 
debates from Cohen sʼ Karl Marxʼs Theory of History 
(1978), Roemer sʼ A General Theory of Exploitation 
and Class (1982), and Elster sʼ Making Sense of Marx 
(1986) up to the discussions of market socialism and 
basic-income capitalism of the last few years.
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One of the main virtues of Roberts sʼ account is 
the way in which it shows the extent and depth of 
the differences between the Analytical Marxists them-
selves, differences which frustrate any deﬁnition of 
the movement beyond the broad methodological one 
attempted above. For example, it is often assumed that 
all Analytical Marxists are methodological individual-
ists, but as Roberts shows there has been a prolonged 
debate within Analytical Marxism between the more 
extreme methodological individualists and those who 
argue that a reference to collective entities and struc-
tures is in some degree essential to social explanation. 
Furthermore, he points out that there has been a 
tendency for some of the main ﬁgures to move away 
from the ﬁrst position and towards the second over the 
last ten years. This is another virtue of the book: that 
it gives a sense of Analytical Marxism as a movement 
with some overall ʻdevelopmental tendencies .ʼ
The clearest of these tendencies, and the ones on 
which Roberts puts most emphasis, are a progressive 
abandonment or weakening of Marx sʼ major social 
theses, and the shift from an interest in social and 
historical explanation towards the elaboration of a 
moral critique of capitalism based on John Rawls sʼ 
and Ronald Dworkin sʼ egalitarian-liberal theories 
of distributive justice. Roberts concludes from them 
that Analytical Marxism as a movement is now over. 
Most of the main protagonists still meet annually for 
three days in September, as they have been doing 
since 1981, and their adherence to an ʻanalyticalʼ 
methodology remains as strong as ever. But by now, 
he argues, there is very little in their shared views 
that could seriously be called ʻMarxistʼ as opposed 
to, say, left-liberal. However, if this is true, then why 
has Roberts subtitled his book ʻa critique ,ʼ rather than, 
say, ʻa historyʼ? Why is there a need for a critique of 
a movement which is dead, and what kind of critique 
is Roberts providing?
Roberts himself seems rather unsure on these 
questions. His technique is to summarize in detail 
each of the main positions that the central Ana-
lytical Marxists have taken – Cohen sʼ functionalist 
reconstruction of Marx sʼ theory of history; Elster sʼ 
attempt to restate Marx sʼ views in the language of 
methodological individualism; Roemer sʼ recasting of 
the concept of exploitation in terms of distributive 
justice; and so on – and then subject it to a series 
of detailed criticisms. In the earlier chapters the 
criticisms appear to come from a somewhat Althus-
serian stance which is never itself defended: against 
the methodological individualists Roberts repeatedly 
invokes the idea of the ʻsystemic logicʼ of capitalism 
which imposes ʻsocial predications ,ʼ and correspond-
ing patterns of behaviour, on individuals. But as the 
book proceeds this rhetoric seems to dry up, and his 
criticisms become more eclectic. Sometimes he repro-
duces arguments from other Marxists who have been 
attacking Analytical Marxism for the last decade. 
But often he argues against one Analytical Marxist 
using points that have been made by another, or at 
least that are thoroughly in the spirit of Analytical 
Marxism as a whole. His earlier stance seems to get 
forgotten as he is drawn more and more into joining 
the internal debates between the Analytical Marxists. 
It is in this mode that he makes his most interesting 
and telling points.
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The result is an odd mixture: partly a history of 
Analytical Marxism, partly a series of criticisms of 
particular positions in it from outside, and partly an 
engagement in its own internal debates, thus in a way 
even a contribution to it. Although in my view the 
quality of Roberts sʼ expositions (often lucid, occasion-
ally misleading) and criticisms (sometimes insightful, 
sometimes inadequate, sometimes misconceived) is 
uneven, and although I suspect that the argument of 
some sections would be hard to follow for a reader 
who did not know the original literature, the book 
certainly constitutes a heroic effort to summarize and 
engage with the main works of Analytical Marxism 
in detail. But the question still remains of how this 
engagement constitutes a ʻcritique .ʼ
In a preface that was clearly written last, Roberts 
acknowledges the extent to which he has entered into 
the discourse of Analytical Marxism, and concludes 
that his critique is an ʻimmanentʼ one. Judging from 
clues elsewhere, what he means is this: by tracing 
the arguments that the Analytical Marxists used 
(or could have used) against each other sʼ positions, 
the book shows that there was a certain intellectual 
inevitability to the way in which Analytical Marxism 
has gradually abandoned Marx sʼ own social theory, 
in favour of a left version of mainstream political 
philosophy together with an interest in constructing 
economic models of society to match its prescriptions. 
To use Roberts sʼ own words, the book shows that 
the ʻattempt to “reconstruct” Marxism through the 
application of “analytical” methodologies establish[es] 
a tension, resolvable only if one term in this equation 
either disgorges or swallows up the otherʼ (p. 14). It 
does so by showing how the Analytical Marxists, by 
remaining true to their analytical methodology, have 
been gradually forced to give up their Marxism. The 
book does not refute Analytical Marxism, but retraces, 
and shows the logic of, the process through which it 
has already refuted itself. It is a Phenomenology of 
Spirit for Analytical Marxism: Hegel sʼ revenge. The 
implicit conclusion is that Marxism as a distinct intel-
lectual (and so political) project can only be salvaged 
if it separates itself from at least large parts of the 
analytical methodology.
By showing the detailed argumentative links 
between the successive positions adopted by the main 
Analytical Marxists, the book does make it plausible to 
think that there is some intellectual inevitability in the 
way the movement has developed. It also makes a good 
case for the view that the upshot of this development 
has been a set of positions which have little that could 
be called distinctively ʻMarxistʼ without stretching 
the ordinary meanings of words. But if this is the 
burden of Roberts sʼ argument, then the Analytical 
Marxists will not be bothered by it. They will see it 
as entirely to the movement sʼ credit that its overall 
development has a certain intellectual inevitability, 
rather than adding up to a series of random zigzags; 
and they will not be bothered by the claim that this 
development has led them to a point where it sounds 
strained to call them ʻMarxistʼ any more. In a recent 
introductory piece on Analytical Marxism (Imprints, 
no. 3), Cohen points out that what distinguishes a 
science from a religion is that it develops beyond the 
theses of its founder. Thus ʻphysics must contradict 
(much of) what Galileo and Newton said: only so 
can it be loyal to the tradition which they founded.ʼ  
Analytical Marxism is to Marx what modern physics 
is to Galileo or Newton: not the preservation of Marx sʼ 
views, but the contemporary development of the study 
that he initiated, which Cohen describes as ʻthe study 
of the nature of, and the route to, socialism, using the 
most advanced resources of social scienceʼ (and, he 
might have added, of normative political philosophy). 
In fact, he says, a better term for this study from the 
start would have been Engels sʼ ʻscientiﬁc socialism ,ʼ 
rather than ʻMarxism .ʼ His implication is clear: what 
matters is not the name of this study, but the continuity 
of its aims with those of its founder, and the coherence 
and methodological unity of its contemporary version. 
If it comes to seem odd to call this contemporary 
version ʻMarxism ,ʼ that is just a sign that the study as 
a whole is outgrowing its founder, as every progres-
sive intellectual discipline eventually must. On this 
view, if Roberts sʼ argument is successful, it does not 
provide a critique of Analytical Marxism, but merely 
a demonstration of how far it has developed beyond 
the views of its founder, and thus a proof of its intel-
lectual maturity.
In deﬁning Analytical Marxism by its commitment 
to socialism, rather than to any speciﬁcally Marxian 
way of conceiving social life, Cohen may be rewrit-
ing its history to some degree. Elster sʼ writings, for 
example, give little sign of such a commitment, and 
the emphasis of the early Analytical Marxist state-
ments was on Marxism as a set of substantive social 
theses rather than as a normative position. But his 
basic point is surely correct. If the aim of socialism 
(perhaps expanded to include real gender and sexual 
equality), together with ʻadvancedʼ social-scientiﬁc 
and philosophical methods, can provide the move-
ment with a distinctive identity, then whether the 
name ʻMarxismʼ really ﬁts it does not matter. With 
or without that name, it can continue to present itself, 
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as Alan Carling proposed in 1986, as an alternative 
paradigm within progressive social thought, alongside 
post-structuralism and critical theory. After all, all 
three of them are descendants of Marx in one way or 
another, but advocates of the other two feel no need 
to call themselves ʻMarxists .ʼ It may be true that this 
paradigm has failed to recruit many followers beyond 
its original advocates; that its output has slowed dras-
tically since the early burst of works dedicated to 
analysing Marx sʼ theory and concepts came to an end 
around 1986; and that it has directly inspired little 
empirical work since then. But none of this shows 
that it is ʻover ,ʼ and in fact it continues to generate 
new work. For example, Imprints, the Bristol-based 
ʻjournal of analytical socialismʼ launched in 1996, 
is squarely within the Analytical Marxist tradition. 
Analytical Marxism (or Socialism) may be a minority 
interest among left academics, but it is certainly not 
dead as an intellectual framework.
In the end, though, this kind of response to Roberts is 
not sufﬁcient. Cohen must be right to think of Marxism 
as a progressive study, and therefore one which it is 
not really appropriate to name after its founder. But 
there is something thoroughly unsatisfactory about 
his characterization of that study as ʻsocialism plus 
up-to-date social science .ʼ What really set Marx apart 
from the ethical socialists who preceded him was not 
that he drew on the best social science of his day, but 
that he tried to understand human society as essentially 
a system of labour. This is the source of the deep 
unity between the central conceptions of his thought: 
of humans as that species of beings which labour for 
each other and live from each other sʼ labour; of a 
social structure as a system of labour that has acquired 
its own autonomy; of ideology and fetishism as the 
illusions that result from this autonomy; of property 
as control and non-control of things within such a 
system; of class as the corresponding polarization of 
humans into consumers and producers; of the state as 
the organization of the dominant class in such a system 
and state politics as a struggle for power between that 
class and its rivals; of history as the development of 
humansʼ productive abilities through a succession of 
such autonomous labour-systems; of capitalism as the 
system of labour in which all property is fully alien-
able, so that its autonomy can take a tangible shape 
as the autonomous movement of self-accumulating 
dead labour; of communism as humankind sʼ collective 
repossession of its own system of labour; of the class 
that owns only its own labour power as the necessary 
agent of this repossession; and ﬁnally of his own work 
as the means by which this class could see the reality 
of its situation and so recognize the necessity of this 
repossession.
If Marx founded a study which was capable of 
progressing beyond his ideas, then surely the idea of 
understanding human life as constituted through a 
system of labour, and engaging with it accordingly, 
remains essential to that study, as essential as the idea 
of understanding physical reality through mathemati-
cal laws remains to post-Galilean physics. Without 
that idea it would cease to be the study that Marx 
founded, just as if physicists gave up understanding 
reality mathematically and instead started trying to 
interpret it like a text then they would no longer be 
practising the science that Galileo founded. It is a 
basic cognitive and practical orientation of this kind, 
rather than simply the aim of socialism, which is 
essential to Marxism; and it is this orientation that 
Analytical Marxism by now seems to have lost, if it 
ever had it.
Roberts does not try to say what he thinks Marxism 
is, but if he has something like this account of it in 
mind when he argues that Analytical Marxism has 
ended up ceasing to be Marxist not by accident but by 
necessity, then his claim is more than a quibble about 
names. It is the claim that the ʻanalyticalʼ method-
ological principles listed above cannot be combined 
with the basic orientation I have described.
This poses a serious challenge to those of us who 
think that this orientation is the best one we have for 
understanding and changing society. Either it has to 
be shown that Roberts is wrong, and that despite the 
experience of the Analytical Marxists it is possible 
to combine the analytical principles with this basic 
orientation; or else the analytical principles have to 
be rejected. The only other alternative is to give up 
the orientation itself.
The challenge is a daunting one. Whichever way 
it is to be met, it looks as if there is at present no 
serious way to develop Marxism except through a 
reconstruction of Marx sʼ essential claims that goes 
deep enough philosophically to be able to demonstrate 
that there is something essentially wrong with the 
way the Analytical Marxists have understood him. In 
this sense, whether Roberts is right or wrong about 
the intellectual inevitability of their development, he 
is right to end by saying that ʻthe project of develop-
ing a successful alternative version of Marxism will 
demand an engagement with the work of the Analytical 
Marxistsʼ (p. 222). Despite its ﬂaws, his book should 
be read by anyone who thinks they can avoid this 
bleak conclusion.
Andrew Chitty
